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"The jury ... invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards
society; and the part which they take in the Government. By oblig-
ing men to turn their attention to affairs which are not exclusively
their own, it rubs off that individual egotism which is the rust of
society."1
-Untied States Supreme Court Justice Kennedy paraphrasing
Alexis de Tocqueville
1. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991). Justice Kennedy is paraphrasing a quote
from Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 334-37 (Schocken 1st ed. 1961).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problems With the Mixed Motive Defense and a Suggested
Alternative
The State of Texas permits attorneys to use race as a factor when se-
lecting jurors during the juror selection process. 2 It is perfectly permissi-
ble for an attorney to have racially discriminatory motives in excluding
potential jurors, as long as an attorney can offer an additional race-neu-
tral reason for striking the juror.3 The Supreme Court has added that this
"race-neutral" explanation does not even have to be persuasive or plausi-
ble, and held that the fact that a potential juror who has, "unkempt
hair, . . . a mustache, and a goatee" would be a sufficient race-neutral
reason.4 In fact, Texas courts have allowed such "race-neutral" reasons
as: wearing earrings in both ears,5 having a thick accent,6 failing to shake
the prosecutor's hand during the course of a demonstration,7 and even
(for goodness sake) looking bored in the courtroom.8 Thus, in Texas, an
attorney can openly exclude a minority from serving as a juror because of
her race as long as he would have excluded her anyway, perhaps merely
because he did not like her earrings.9
It would appear axiomatic that such malfeasances of the juror selection
process should not occur since the Supreme Court of the United States
has determined that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
2. See generally Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (permitting
the consideration of race as a factor in the exercising of a peremptory strike, so long as it is
not the only factor). But see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.261 (Vernon 2003) (prohibit-
ing peremptory challenges based on race); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, (1986)
(explicitly prohibiting the consideration of race as a factor during the juror selection
process).
3. See generally Guzman, at 244 (holding that in mixed motive strikes, "if the striking
party shows that he would have struck the juror based solely on the neutral reasons, then
the strike does not violate the juror's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of
the law.").
4. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
5. Wilson v. Texas, No. 05-01-00999-CR, No. 05-01-01000-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS
985, at *5 (Dallas [15th Dist.] Jan. 31, 2003, no pet.).
6. Rosales v. Texas, No. 03-00-00201-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 7755, at *10 (Austin
[3rd Dist.] Nov. 16, 2001, no pet.).
7. Roberts v. Texas, No. 14-96-00899-CR, 1998 Tex. App. Lexis 5925, at *3 (Houston
[14th Dist.] Sept. 24, 1998, pet. ref'd).
8. York v. Texas, 764 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
ref'd). See also Mandujano v. Texas, 966 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App. - Austin 1998, pet.
ref'd) (holding that a Hispanic veniremen who left "important papers in the courtroom
when everyone went to lunch" was a permissible race-neutral explanation for the chal-
lenged strike).
9. See generally Wilson, No. 05-01-00999-CR, No. 05-01-01000-CR, at *5 (excluding a
juror for dislike of her earrings).
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Clause prohibits the peremptorial removal of a potential juror based
solely on the juror's race. a° But because of a somewhat obscure constitu-
tional analysis, colloquially termed the "mixed motive" or "dual motiva-
tion" doctrine, the State of Texas has allowed such pre-textual
circumventions of the constitutional protections afforded to the juror se-
lection process."1
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the validity of the "mixed
motive" or "dual motivation" analysis as applied in the context of Batson/
Edmonson challenges. The Comment seeks to distinguish the application
of this constitutional causation analysis in the context of Batson/Edmon-
son challenges from that of other Fourteenth Amendment contexts. Fur-
thermore, the Comment takes the position that the State of Texas would
be better served by readopting its initial stance on the issue and returning
to the "taint view," which holds that once discriminatory intent is admit-
ted during the juror selection process, the equal protection component of
the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated and the entire juror selec-
tion process is tainted.' 2
Initially, this Comment will examine the origination and present state
of the Untied States Supreme Court's application of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to racially motivated juror exclu-
sion. Furthermore, the Comment will examine the origins and applica-
tion of the mixed motive doctrine in Texas courts. Additionally, the
Comment seeks to bolster the premise that the mixed motive doctrine is
inoperable in BatsonlEdmonson challenges in the sense that it produces
results that are inconsistent with the protections afforded to jurors by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and prior judicial
interpretations thereof. The Comment concludes with a brief examina-
tion of suggestions to eliminate purposeful discrimination in the juror se-
lection process.
B. The Peremptory Challenge
There are two types of challenges parties may avail themselves of dur-
ing the juror selection process in order to facilitate the removal of pro-
spective jurors from the panel of prospective jurors. These are:
challenges for cause and peremptory strikes.1 3 Challenges for cause are
10. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
11. See generally Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (accepting
the mixed motive doctrine in the context of Batson/Edmonson challenges).
12. See Speaker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
no writ).
13. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(a), at 289 (2d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2000).
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unlimited in number, but are limited in scope and require the rendering
of an explanation to be found acceptable by the trial judge.14 Peremptory
challenges, contrarily, are generally limited in number and require no ex-
planation or plausible reason.15 Generally, they are based on the percep-
tions of the striking attorney about the bias a particular juror may harbor
that is not beneficial to his client.
A peremptory strike, by its nature, is necessarily discriminatory and
reflects preconceived notions as to the potential biases a juror will have
when evaluating the case. The Supreme Court of the United States has
specifically held that one of the features of a peremptory challenge is that
it is discriminatory by implication and is beyond the control of the
court. 6 Allowing an attorney to peremptorily strike potential jurors
without cause is a judicial recognition of the fears and biases that we all
foster in one way or another. However, it is the abuse of this power that
is the cause of the denial of the equal protection of the law to potential
jurors as well as the defendant.
C. The Effects of Racially Discriminatory Juror Exclusion
Although the mixed motive doctrine is uniformly applied to the per-
emptory challenge process and its repercussions can equally affect all
races and genders, it is particularly problematic for minority groups. In
practice, the mixed motive doctrine can be worked to undo the protec-
tions afforded by the Equal Protection Clause in discriminatorily exclud-
ing a potential juror based on his or her race. This practice is
unconstitutional and violates the rights of both the potential juror who
was excluded because of his or her race, as well as the minority
defendant. a7
The practice of peremptorily striking a potential juror based on his or
her race is a brand of inferiority on the minority population in general.
Implicit in the strike are two underlying stereo-typical misconceptions:
one, that minorities are incapable of carrying out justice because of their
race or a presumed racial-bond that is inherent to minorities; and two, a
misguided preconception that all members of a minority group share the
same biases. 8 Such categorical assumptions about minorities not only
affect the minority groups themselves, but also further perpetuate the so-
cietal stereotyping of minorities.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
17. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415
(1991).
18. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 104-05.
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With a minority population of 47.6 percent," the problem is particu-
larly compounded in the State of Texas. Such a large minority population
results in more minority persons implicated in the trial process who are
likely to feel the sting of purposeful discrimination. As such, the State of
Texas, specifically the Court of Criminal Appeals, should act to eliminate
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine in
the context of Batson/Edmonson challenge hearings. Furthermore, the
elimination of the mixed motive doctrine would facilitate the furtherance
of racial equality in the juror selection process.
II. BACKGROUND: BATSON AND THE MIXED MOTIVE DOCTRINE
A. Case Studies: A Historical Overview of the Supreme Court of the
United States Application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Racially Motivated Juror Exclusion
The Batson/Edmonson decisions were the derivatives of gradual social
changes, mass racial integration, and racial equality movements encom-
passing a time period that commenced in the post-civil war era and whose
zenith occurred in the mid-eighties with the rendering of the Batson opin-
ion. As such, Batson can be best understood as the derivative of a pro-
gression of cases that advanced the protections afforded by the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus, it is important to examine the historical pro-
gression of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the juror
selection process.
The trail of litigation that ultimately led to the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racially motivated
peremptory strikes in Batson v. Kentucky spanned well over a century.
Once the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded
the categorical exclusion of minorities from sitting on juries,20 more than
one hundred years would pass before the Court applied similar reasoning
to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment also prohibited discriminatorily
motivated peremptory strikes during the juror selection process.21
The road to the Batson decision originated with the Supreme Court's
post-civil war recognition that the exclusion of African-Americans from
the opportunity to serve as jurors, because of their race, abridged the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 This holding,
19. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Texas, 2000, at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited on Feb. 13, 2004).
20. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (prohibiting a West Virginian
statute forbidding African-Americans from serving as jurors).
21. Batson, 476 U.S. at 79-80.
22. See generally Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303 (holding that the West Virginia statute ex-
cluding African-Americans from sitting as jurors is unconstitutional).
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found in Strauder v. West Virginia, was the Court's first examination of
racially based juror exclusion. 3
i. Strauder v. West Virginia: The Fourteenth Amendment Protects
the Rights of African-Americans to Sit on Juries
The Supreme Court's first attempt to cease racially motivated juror dis-
crimination occurred in 1879, when the Court struck down a West Vir-
ginia statute that denied African-Americans the right to sit for jury
service.24 The Court overturned a murder conviction of an African-
American West Virginian, by an all-white jury, as a violation of the equal
protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.25 Specifically, the Court held that the exclusion of all members of
the defendant's race from the jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment.26
The Court denounced the denial of the opportunity to African-Ameri-
cans to participate in the administration of justice as jurors and called this
a brand of inferiority.27
Although this case involved a statute that prohibited persons who were
not white males from jury service,28 the decision ultimately rested on the
denial of the equal protection of the law to African-Americans when
criminally accused. Furthermore, the holding did not touch upon the dis-
crimination suffered by potential jurors who were precluded from sitting
on the jury as a result of their race.29
This decision was further supplemented in Ex parte Virginia, where the
Court held that although an African-American is not constitutionally en-
titled to a jury consisting of members of his own race, any racially moti-
vated denial of the right to serve as jurors to African-Americans violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3" The Court
later solidified this principal in Carter v. Texas, where it held that any
State action that resulted in the exclusion of African-Americans, solely
because of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal
prosecution of a person of the African-American race, resulted in a de-
23. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 310.
26. Id. at 312.
27. Id. at 308.
28. See id. at 305 (quoting the West Virginia statute that only permitted white males
who were over the age of twenty-one to serve as jurors).
29. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
30. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879); see also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
565, 568 (1896) (arguing that objective factors, such as age, must be used to determine
juror eligibility).
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nial of the equal protection of the law.31 Subsequently, the Court ex-
tended the ambit of protection to apply to any identifiable group that
may be the subject of prejudice.32
At the time, the Strauder and Ex parte Virginia decisions were momen-
tous accomplishments in the expansion of equal protection rights in the
context of juror discrimination but did little in application to prevent
prosecutors from discriminatorily excluding African-Americans and
other minorities from jury panels. Prosecutors could simply exercise per-
emptory strikes during juror selection to accomplish de facto33 juror dis-
crimination. Moreover, the decisions in Strauder and Carter were
promulgated to address regional legislation and prosecutorial subversions
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of the total exclusion of an
entire race from sitting on juries. The Court had yet to squarely confront
the prosecutorial practice of peremptorily striking potential jurors in an
effort to achieve homogeneous juries, much less the harm imposed upon
the potential jurors who were excluded as a result of their race.
ii. Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremptory Strikes to Achieve
the Systematic Exclusion of African-Americans from Sitting
on Juries is Unconstitutional
Nearly a century after the Strauder ruling, the Warren Court granted
certiorari34 to a case where it confronted a claim that equal protection
had been denied through the application of prosecutorial racially moti-
vated peremptory strikes as a device to exclude African-Americans from
sitting as jurors.35
Robert Swain, an African-American, was sentenced to death by an all-
white Alabama jury for raping a Caucasian woman.3 6 Swain moved to
quash the indictment because the prosecutor struck all the African-
Americans from the venire.3 7 The Court held that in order to meet the
31. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).
32. Hernandez v. Texas, 374 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
33. The definition of de facto is: "In fact, in deed, actually." BLACK'S LAW DICrION-
ARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
34. A writ of certiorari is: "The name of a writ of review or inquiry." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
35. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965); see also Smith v. Texas 311 U.S.
128, 130 (1940) (holding that "for racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury
service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws en-
acted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a represen-
tative government"); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950) (stating "jurymen
should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as mem-
bers of a race").
36. Swain 380 U.S. at 231.
37. Id. at 210-11.
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burden of establishing a prima facie3 8 case of juror discrimination, the
criminal defendant must demonstrate the prosecutorial implementation
of a juror selection process that was contrived to achieve the systematic
exclusion of African-Americans from sitting on juries.39 In this instance,
the Court ultimately concluded that Swain had failed to overcome the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
with regard to the composition of the jury, and upheld his conviction.4 °
Interestingly though, Swain also contended that the taint of prejudice
extended to the selection of the jurors during voir dire,41 in that some of
the prosecution's peremptory strikes were used discriminatorily to fur-
ther affect the composition of the jury.42 The Court reasoned that the
nature of the peremptory challenge was necessarily discriminatory and
could be used to strike, "any group of otherwise qualified jurors in any
given case, whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants, or those
with blue eyes.",4 3 The Court further refused to apply the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to the use of peremptory challenges, however it did recognize
that in some instances the racially discriminatorily motivated exercise of
the peremptory challenge might violate the Fourteenth Amendment
when a defendant could establish, "the prosecutor's systematic use of per-
emptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time" to the extent
that it resulted in the systematic exclusion of the African-American race
from serving as jurors.44 Ultimately, the Court held that peremptory
strikes of potential jurors are presumed to be legitimate, absent the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case of discrimination.45
Swain was a progressive step in the curtailment of racially motivated
peremptory strikes. The Court recognized the potential abuse of the per-
emptory strike when prejudicially motivated. However, the burden of
proof on the movant to overcome the presumption of legitimacy was
practically insurmountable.
38. The definition of prima facie is: "On the face of it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
479 (4th ed. 1968).
39. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (holding that a defendant must come forth with, "such
proof [that] might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries
for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the
peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population.").
40. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22 (1965).
41. Voir dire is defined as: "The preliminary examination the court may make of one
presented as a juror." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 210.
43. Id. at 212.
44. Id. at 227.
45. Id. at 223-24.
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Lower courts interpreted the holding in Swain to require proof of a
pattern of striking African-Americans over a number of cases in order to
overcome this presumption of legitimacy.46 In United States v. Pearson,4
the Fifth Circuit acknowledged this cumbersome burden of proof and as-
serted that overcoming it might require an investigation as to the compo-
sitions of juries and the manner in which each side exercised its
peremptory challenges." 8 The court then noted: "In jurisdictions where
court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire proceed-
ings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable.""9 This
insuperable burden of proof caused a number of State courts to hold that
excluding persons from juries because of their race was a violation of the
right to an impartial jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment.5 °
With the stringent evidentiary touchstone, in place, the racially moti-
vated use of the peremptory strike would remain virtually irrefutable, in
practice, for the next twenty years until the Supreme Court's ruling in
Batson v. Kentucky in 1986.
iii. Batson v. Kentucky: Racially Motivated Peremptory Strikes Are
Unconstitutional
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court undertook to clarify the law
relative to the prejudicial application of peremptory strikes exercised to
effectuate juror discrimination.5 Despite previously holding that the
very essence of the peremptory strike is prejudicial and is beyond the
control of the court, the Court now sought to narrow the scope of permis-
sible motivation for peremptory juror strikes and applied the Fourteenth
46. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1213-18 (5th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Boykin,
679 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1983);
Thigpen v. State, 270 So.2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 876, 878 (1968);
Johnson v. State, 262 A.2d 792, 796-97 (1970); State v. Johnson, 311 A.2d 389, 390 (per
curium) (1973); State v. Shaw, 200 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1973).
47. U.S. v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1213-18 (5th Cir. 1971).
48. Interestingly, when examining the difficult burden of proof Swain placed on liti-
gants, the Fifth Circuit sated that, "In the six years which have passed since Swain, we have
not found a single instance in which a defendant has prevailed on this issue."
49. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 767-68 (1978).
50. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). The Supreme Court would later
hold that the Sixth Amendment was not applicable to the exclusion of members of any
distinctive group during the peremptory challenge stage of trials and refused to permit an
objection to the peremptory strike of a prospective juror based on race, under the Sixth
Amendment. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990).
51. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (formulating a three-step process for evaluat-
ing claims of alleged racially motivated peremptory strikes).
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Amendment for the first time to the racially motivated peremptory
strike.52
James Batson, an African-American, was charged with second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods.53 During voir dire, the prosecutor
exercised his peremptory strikes to remove all four African-American
persons from the venire,54 and subsequently selected a jury composed
only of Caucasian persons. Despite objection by the defense, the trial
court ruled that the prosecution was entitled to strike anybody they saw
fit and that the defendant failed to overcome the Swain evidentiary re-
quirement of showing a prosecutorial systematic exclusion of all African-
Americans from sitting as jurors.56
Upon review, the Supreme Court abandoned the tenuous evidentiary
requirement as to the criteria required to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination as proposed in Swain.57 The Court held that a
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
in the jury selection process based solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges.58 Thus, not only did the
Court abolish the strict Swain evidentiary requirement of proving a sys-
tematic exclusion of African-Americans from sitting as jurors, but also
subsequently established a three-part test for trial courts to use when a
defendant raises a claim of purposeful discrimination during the peremp-
tory challenge stage of a trial.59
The first step in establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimi-
nation requires the defendant to establish his membership in a cognizable
racial group or the discriminatory intent against a group.6" Second, the
defendant may rely on the undisputed fact that peremptory challenges
are inherently discriminatory.61 Third, the defendant must show that the
prosecutor used his peremptory strikes to remove members of the defen-
dant's race from the venire.62 The trial court must consider all relevant
52. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (finding "[t]he essential nature of
the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without in-
quiry, and without being subject to the court's control.").
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
54. The term venire is defined as: "Originally used as the names of the writ for sum-
moning a jury; commonly used to describe the jury panel." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479
(4th ed. 1968).
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 96.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 96-97.
60. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
61. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
62. Id.
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circumstances when determining whether the defendant has made this
requisite showing.63 Upon making this prima facie showing, the burden
shifts to the prosecution, who must offer a racially neutral explanation for
striking the jurors.' The Court stopped short of proposing acceptable
explanations, but did hold that a mere denial of discriminatory intent or
the reliance upon the assumption that members of a minority race would
be more sympathetic to members of their own race would not be
adequate.65
The trial court is then charged with making a determination, based on
all the facts and circumstances, of whether a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment rights have been violated.66
Compelled by the Court's desire to eliminate the crippling burden of
proving a systematic perversion of the juror selection process as required
under Swain,6 7 the new evidentiary requirements clarified the disillusion
as to the application of the Swain evidentiary burden and also resolved
the question as to how the Fourteenth Amendment would apply in the
case of juror discrimination.
Although Batson was a historic step towards ending the insidious prac-
tice of purposeful discrimination during the peremptory challenge pro-
cess, doubt remained as to whether it would actually end racial
discrimination in the context of peremptory strikes.68 Prosecutors could
easily assert race-neutral reasons for striking jurors and circumnavigate
the evidentiary requirements, and trial judges lacked an objective test for
evaluating prosecutorial motives. Attorneys even confess to the ease at
which the Batson requirements are rebutted. 69 Furthermore, the trial
court's subjective evaluation of the discriminatory nature of the strike is
63. Id.
64. Id. at 97. And indeed, this step of the three-step Batson process is the step with
which this Comment primarily takes at issue. Careful reading reveals that this step merely
requires the showing of any alternate reason for excluding a juror other than for his race,
thus possibly acknowledging prejudicial motivations while at the same time excusing them
as incidental.
65. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
66. Id. at 98.
67. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965) (requiring the showing of a sys-
tematic perversion of the juror selection process in order to prove unconstitutional discrim-
ination in the juror selection process).
68. As Justice Marshall noted in his concurrence, "[T]he decision today will not end
the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process." Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-103 (1986).
69. See Tony Mauro, Jury Selection is Sure to be a Challenge, USA TODAY, Sept. 26,
1994, at 2A.
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difficult, at best, to review upon appeal7 ° and all remedial sanctions for a
Batson violation are largely left to the discretion of the trial court.71
As Justice Marshall subsequently noted in dissent,
"Batson's greatest flaw is its implicit assumption that courts are capa-
ble of detecting race-based challenges to Afro-American jurors. As-
suming good faith on the part of all involved, Batson's mandate
required the parties to confront and overcome their own racism on
all levels,72 a most difficult challenge to meet. This flaw has ren-
dered Batson ineffective against all but the most obvious examples
of racial prejudice - the cases in which a proffered neutral explana-
tion plainly betrays an underlying impermissible purpose. ',73
Notwithstanding its critics, the Batson decision was a judicial de-
nouncement of the utilization of racially motivated peremptory strikes
during the juror selection process. Moreover, Batson spawned a progeny
of litigation that would subsequently expand the protections provided by
the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
juror selection process.
The first in this trilogy of cases is Powers v. Ohio.74 In Powers, the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights of the
potential jurors who were excluded from a jury because of their race.75
This was the first decision to extend equal protection rights, in the context
of the peremptory challenge stage of the juror selection process, to some-
one other than the criminal defendant. The decision also settled a stand-
ing issue as to whether a criminal defendant could raise the third-party
equal protection rights of jurors who were excluded because of their
race.
76
70. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) ("Since the trial judge's findings in
the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of creditability, a re-
viewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.").
71. See id. at 99-100 (1986) ("In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed
in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best
to implement our holding today.").
72. Id. at 106.
73. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989).
74. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, (1991).
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id. at 415. The notion of a criminal defendant raising the equal protection rights
of jurors who were excluded because of their race stemmed from the fact that in Powers,
the criminal defendant's race differed from that of the excluded jurors. The state argued
that because the defendant was Caucasian, he lacked standing to object to the exclusion of
prospective African-American jurors. The Court held that barring the claims of the defen-
dant because he was of a different race than that of the excluded jurors, "would be to
condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury
service."
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Later that same year, the Court extended Batson equal protection
rights to litigants in civil trials.77 In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
the Court held that private litigants could raise equal protection claims
based on racially motivated peremptory strikes in civil litigation.78 Up
until that point, Batson peremptory strike protections had only been ex-
tended (by implication) to criminal defendants.
Subsequently, the Batson peremptory strike equal protection analysis
would be extended to prohibit criminal defendants from using peremp-
tory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, and thus applying the
reasoning in Batson to prohibit any party (not just prosecutors) from as-
serting a racially motivated peremptory strike.7 9
B. The Supreme Court of the United States Development and the
Proliferation of the Fourteenth Amendment Mixed Motive or
Dual Motivation Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive, or dual motivation, doc-
trine holds that equal protection claims may be rebutted by a showing
that the same decision would have been reached even in the absence of
the alleged protected conduct. Thus, when a movant makes a claim that
his or her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights have been vio-
lated as a result of disparate treatment received from the opposing party,
the accused party may rebut this claim by making a showing that the mo-
vant would have suffered the same result even if the questionable inci-
dent or action had not occurred. Perhaps put more succinctly,
"In the realm of constitutional law, whenever a challenged action
would be unlawful if improperly motivated, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the challenged action is invalid if motivated in part
by an impermissible reason but that the alleged offender is entitled
77. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
78. Id.
79. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). In subsequent decisions, the
Court would also hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited racially motivated per-
emptory strikes in the context of ethnicity and gender. See e.g., Hernandez v. New York
111 S. Ct. 1859, 1865-66 (1991) (applying Batson to ethnicity); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127 (1994) (applying Batson to gender). Subsequent cases expanded of the protections
afforded by Batson/Edmonson to nearly every identifiable racial group and nationality.
See e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-80 (1954) (extending Batson/Edmonson to
persons of Mexican descent); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987)
(applying Batson/Edmonson protections to American Indians); State v. Alien, 616 So. 2d
452, 452 (Fla. 1993) (holding that Batson/Edmonson applies to protect Hispanics); State v.
Rambersed, 649 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (affording Batson/Edmonson to
Italian-Americans).
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to the defense that it would have taken the same action in the ab-
sence of the improper motive., 80
This principle is necessarily implicated during the application of a Bat-
son/Edmonson hearing regarding the legitimacy of an alleged discrimina-
torily motivated peremptory strike. The mixed motive doctrine comes
into play during the third-step of the Batson/Edmonson challenge pro-
cess. In a Batson/Edmonson challenge, a movant makes a motion to the
court that the opposing party has peremptorily struck a potential juror
because he or she is of a cognizable minority group and raises a claim of
purposeful discrimination during the peremptory challenge process (i.e.
makes a claim that a juror has been struck on the account of race). Once
the movant makes this claim, the opposing party is charged with offering
a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike.8 If the court finds
the explanation to be race-neutral, the analysis ends and the peremptory
strike is validated.
Where the Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine becomes
applicable is in situations where the party accused of making the discrimi-
natorily motivated peremptory strike admits that race played a factor in
his or her decision to strike the juror, but was coupled with the considera-
tion of some other race-neutral reason. The effect of this defense is to say
that race was a consideration in striking the juror, but it was not the only
reason, and therefore, because considerations other than race were at
play the strike is constitutional since the potential juror could have been
struck for the other causes anyway.
The application of the mixed motive doctrine during a Batson/Edmon-
son hearing requires the party making the peremptory strike to show that
it would have reached the same decision as to whether to exclude the
potential juror regardless of substance or quantity of any accompanying
racial considerations.
The concept that an openly admitted discriminatorily motivated per-
emptory strike could be negated by offering an accompanying racially-
neutral justification for the strike finds its judicial endorsement in two
equal protection cases from the late seventies.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation82 and Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,83 in the context of equal protection claims raised regarding facially
neutral zoning legislation and wrongful termination, respectfully, the Su-
80. Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 235 (3rd Cir. 2002) (quoting Batson).
81. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
82. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
83. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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preme Court of the United States enunciated and endorsed the Four-
teenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine.
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpora-
tion, in determining that the Village of Arlington Heights84 was not pur-
posefully discriminate in the denial of the petitioner's rezoning request,
the Court held that:
"[P]roof that the decision [denying a request for rezoning] by the
Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose
would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged
decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the
burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."85
This was the Court's initial pronouncement of the concept that is collo-
quially referred to as the Fourteenth Amendment "mixed motive" or
"dual motivation" doctrine. In a wrongful termination opinion rendered
concurrently with Arlington Heights, the Court bolstered the mixed mo-
tive doctrine by deferring to precedence from other categories of consti-
tutional law in support for its ubiquitous application of the mixed motive
doctrine to Fourteenth Amendment constitutional law analysis.86
In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, the
Court applied the mixed motive doctrine to a wrongful termination case
and held that although the lower court applied a pertinent causation test,
it should have:
"... gone on to determine whether the [School] Board had shown by
the preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence
of the protected conduct., 87
The Court utilized the mixed motive doctrine to hold that even if the
school board (employer) had wrongfully terminated the employment of
the teacher (employee) based on his constitutionally protected conduct,
the employer needed only to show that it could have reached the same
decision (regarding whether to terminate the employee) based on some
other reason, without taking into account the protected conduct.88
84. A suburb of Chicago, Illinois.
85. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271
n.21 (1977).
86. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-287
(1977).
87. Id. at 287.
88. Id.
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The Court appeared to come to the conclusion that the mixed motive
doctrine was necessary as a matter of common sense and judicial conve-
nience.89 In a reference to the lower court's application of a causation
test found to be inappropriate, the Court held that the difficulty with
utilizing a causation test that was surmised to determine to what degree,
if any, the remnants of perception and initial impression regarding the
employee's prior conduct, now validated as protected conduct, played a
role in the decision not to rehire the employee would:
"[R]equire reinstatement in cases where a dramatic and perhaps ab-
rasive incident is inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the
decision to rehire, and does indeed play a part in that decision - even
if the same decision would have been reached had the incident not
occurred."9'
Apparently Justice Rehnquist saw the use of the mixed motive doctrine
in Fourteenth Amendment cases as a matter of practicality in application
and moreover, he deferred to other areas of constitutional law where the
Court had formulated similar tests of causation to determine whether an
individual's constitutional rights had been violated (cases involving the
constitutionality of criminal confessions made more than once in states of
both voluntariness and involuntariness).91 Although he admitted that the
type of causation on which these cases turn upon is distinct, Rehnquist
further surmised that they do suggest that the proper test to apply in the
employment discrimination context is one that, "likewise protects against
the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable
consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights."92
This premise appears to advance the idea that such causation tests
should take into account the assurance of constitutional rights without an
overindulging concern for producing unwanted results. Perhaps in such
wrongful termination contexts, the Court is advancing the notion that
causation tests like the Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine
are devices of practicality. Implicated by necessity in an effort to prevent
an employer from declining to rehire an employee he had previously
wrongfully terminated and not having his decision judicially invalidated
merely because it was surmised, to some extent, on the account of unde-
sired protected conduct on behalf of the employee.
89. Id. at 285.
90. Id..
91. Id. at 286. Specifically, the Court cited to four cases (Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596 (1944); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338 (1970); and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
92. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
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The application of the rulings in Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy
makes it clear that in the context of equal protection claims, where both
impermissible and permissible motivations exist for the defendant's egre-
gious action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the defendant
need only show that the plaintiff would have suffered the same outcome
because of the permissible motivation, even had the defendant not con-
templated an impermissible motivation. 93
The decisions in Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy have been applied
in the context of Batson/Edmonson challenges to require a party who
openly admits to the consideration of race as a factor in exercising a per-
emptory strike to simply subsequently validate the peremptory strike by
offering an accompanying race-neutral reason for the strike.94 Most of
the lower federal courts have applied the mixed motive doctrine in Bat-
son/Edmonson challenges without expressly determining its validity in
such a context. 95 The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to
determine whether the mixed motive doctrine is applicable to Batson/Ed-
monson challenges.96 Thus, under the current state of constitutional law,
the mixed motive doctrine is the proper causation test in equal protection
claims and furthermore, the mixed motive doctrine is properly implicated
during juror discrimination Fourteenth Amendment claims.
It is the intent of this Comment to distinguish the mixed motive doc-
trine in a Batson/Edmonson challenge context as applied in other areas of
constitutional law and to show that the analysis is flawed to the extent
that it would allow a litigant to openly use race as a factor to discrimina-
torily affect the composition of a jury panel.
93. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985).
94. In Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 26 (2nd Cir. 1993) a Federal Circuit Court
addressed for the first time a mixed motive Batson/Edmonson challenge case and held that
the mixed motive doctrine was applicable in the context of a Batson/Edmonson challenge.
See also Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 233-34 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Darden, 70
F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995); Wallace v.
Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520,
1533 (11th Cir. 1996); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001); Rico v.
Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 180 (3rd Cir. 2003). But see United States v. Alcantar, 897
F.2d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to adopt the mixed motive doctrine). Subsequent
Ninth Circuit cases have also declined to adopt the analysis. See e.g., Johnson v. Vasquez, 3
F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir. 1993).
95. See Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d
222, 234-35 (3rd Cir. 2002); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001); Wal-
lace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1996); and Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d
24, 30 (2nd Cir. 1993).
96. See Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924 (1989) (denying certiorari).
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III. THE VIEW FROM TEXAS COURTS: A CHRONOLOGY OF CASE LAW
Texas courts acquiesced to the federal rule9 7 long ago, and have con-
demned the consideration of race as a factor in the selection of jurors.
Texas courts have also held that a defendant is denied the equal protec-
tion of the law when potential jurors are excluded based on the consider-
ation of their race.98 However, the mixed motive doctrine has presented
a challenge to the State's highest courts. Case law indicates varying senti-
ments in regard to the Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine. 99
A state appellate court decided the case of initial impression in Texas to
implicate the federal mixed motive doctrine in a Batson/Edmonson chal-
lenge context. 1°° The Court unequivocally held that any admission of the
consideration of race during the juror selection process taints the entire
process to the extent that the consideration of other contributing factors
would be counterintuitive.'0 ° In subsequent opinions, both the Texas Su-
preme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the State's two
highest courts, agreed that the "taint view" was an appropriate posi-
tion.10 2 However, this was merely a passing fancy, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals would subsequently abrogate these opinions and hold
97. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2003), based on § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (declaring
"[n]o citizen possession all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall
be disqualified for service as grand or petite juror in any Court of the United States, or of
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, being
an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors,
excluded or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not more than
$5,000.").
98. Cassell v. State, 216 S.W. 2d 813, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 129-32 (1940).
99. See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991), (holding that "equal pro-
tection is denied when race is a factor in counsel's exercise of a peremptory challenge to a
prospective juror."). See also Speaker v. State, 740 S.W. 2d 486, 489 (Tex. App. - Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), (holding that, "a prosecutor's admission that race was an influ-
encing factor in the selection process vitiates the legitimacy of the entire procedure."); cf
Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), (holding, "when the motives
behind a challenged peremptory strike are "mixed," i.e., both impermissible (race or gen-
der-based) and permissible (race and gender neutral), if the striking party shows that he
would have struck the juror based solely on the neutral reasons, then the strike does not
violate the juror's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law.").
100. See generally Speaker, 740 S.W. 2d at 489 (holding improper influences, such as
race, may not be a determining factor in the selection of jurors).
101. See generally id.
102. Powers, 813 S.W.2d at 491; Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 868 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992).
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that the federal mixed motive doctrine is applicable in the BatsonlEd-
monson challenge context. 10 3
A. Texas Appellate Courts Reject the Mixed Motive Doctrine
The Court of Appeals for the First District in Houston was the first
court in Texas to hear a Batson/Edmonson challenge that implicated the
federal mixed motive doctrine. In Speaker v. State, a prosecutor used his
peremptory strikes to remove nine of the ten African-American venire-
men 10 4 from the jury.'0 5 The defendant contended that he was denied a
fair and impartial trial as a result of the prosecutor's racially motivated
peremptory strikes.'0 6 The prosecutor admitted that he had considered
race as a factor when selecting jurors, but that it was not an "overriding
factor." 
1 0 7
Although the court commended the prosecutor for his candor, the
court held that the prosecutor's admission that he considered race as an
influencing factor during the juror selection process "vitiat[ed] the legiti-
macy of the entire procedure." 108 The court declined to mitigate the
appellant's Batson/Edmonson Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing
the prosecutor to offer alternative factors in his decision to strike the Af-
rican-American veniremen and thus rejected the mixed motive doctrine in
favor of the "taint view. ' '109
The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District in Corpus Christi was
the next Texas court to adjudicate a Batson/Edmonson mixed motive
case.'1 0 In McKinney v. State, the court declined to apply the federal
mixed motive doctrine and instead followed the "taint view"." Specifi-
cally, the court held that, "[n]o neutral explanation can serve to rebut the
presumption that the condemned practice of exclusion based on race oc-
103. See generally Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 851-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(reitifying the validity of the mixed motive doctrine, although declining to reconsider it
under the circumstances of the case); Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 244.
104. The definition of veniremen is: "Members of the panel of jurors." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
105. Speaker, 740 S.W. 2d at 488. It should be noted that the tenth and remaining
African-American on the venire was struck by the defense counsel.
106. Id. at 489.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Houston would later reiterate
this holding in Moore v. State, 811 S.W.2d 197, (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ
ref'd).
110. See McKinney v. State, 761 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1988, no
writ), (upholding the "taint view").
111. Id.
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curred when the prosecutor admits that such an exclusion did occur. ' 1 2
Although the court made no specific mention of the mixed motive doc-
trine, it can be inferred from the court's reasoning and application of the
"taint view" that such further analysis into the prosecutor's motives for
excluding the named jurors was not pertinent.'1 3
B. Powers v. Palacios: The Texas Supreme Court Holds That Any
Consideration of Race During the Juror Selection Process
Violates the Equal Protection Clause
In Powers v. Palacios,'1 4 the Supreme Court of Texas followed suit and
endorsed the "taint view" approach to determining whether equal protec-
tion has been denied when race has been considered as a factor during
the juror selection process. In the Powers case, a party accused of consid-
ering race as a factor during jury selection admitted that race contributed
to his decision to exclude the respective jurors, but was not the only rea-
son for the strike.1 15 In a per curiam" 6 opinion, the court held that the
consideration of race when exercising a peremptory strike is a denial of
equal protection." 7
C. Hill v. State: The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Endorses the
Mixed Motive or Dual Motivation Doctrine
Less than a year after the Texas Supreme Court rendered the opinion
in Powers v. Palacios, a divided Texas Court of Criminal Appeals" 8 sit-
ting en banc" 9 departed from the "taint view" approach and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine.121 In Hill v. State, the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the consideration of race during the
juror selection process is unconstitutional, but only to the extent that is
the only factor considered in the exclusion of a juror. 2' Specifically, the
court held that, "race may be a factor coexisting with a non-racial reason
for the strike, however, race may not be the reason for the strike."' 22 The
112. Id.
113. See generally id. (arguing that the court was not persuaded that race was a mere
factor and not the reason for striking the individual from the jury).
114. See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991).
115. Id. at 490.
116. "A phrased used to distinguish an opinion written by the Chief Justice or presid-
ing judge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
117. Powers, 813 S.W.2d at 491.
118. The state's highest criminal court.
119. "All justices sitting for trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
120. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
121. Id. at 866.
122. Id.
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Hill court proffered the mixed motive concept in its reasoning to hold
that potential jurors who are struck due to the consideration of race are
not automatically entitled to an equal protection claim under Batson/Ed-
monson if they would have been struck for a race-neutral reason
anyway.
123
In a sweeping blow to Fourteenth Amendment protections the state's
highest criminal court abandoned the "taint view" endorsed by the State
Supreme Court and two state appellate courts and upheld a mixed motive
doctrine to a Batson!Edmonson challenge. 124 Interestingly, the court
chose not to address or distinguish Speaker, Powers, or McKinney in ren-
dering its opinion.125
D. Benavides v. American Chrome & Chemicals, Inc.: The Texas
Supreme Court Reiterates its Position in Powers and the
Validity of the "Taint View"
In Benavides v. American Chrome & Chemicals, Inc., a Batson/Edmon-
son case out the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District in Corpus
Christi, the court diverged from Hill and the mixed motive doctrine to
once again endorse the "taint view".126 The court went so far as to say
that the Texas Supreme Court had further extended the BatsonlEdmon-
son protections beyond that of other jurisdictions to the extent that it had
reversed cases where race was a factor in the consideration of the selec-
tion of jurors even when coupled with alternative race-neutral reasons. 27
Benavides was subsequently appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. In
a published order of denial of application for writ of error,128 the State
Supreme Court purposely restated its position, presumably in light of
Hill, that equal protection is denied when a race is considered as a factor
in the exclusion of a juror during voir dire.1 29 While in approval of the of
the appellate court's application of "taint view" approach, the court re-
jected the appellate court's suggestion that it was advancing the protec-
tions of Batson/Edmonson. The court stated that it disagreed with the
appellate court's language that, "we and the Texas Supreme Court have
gone a step further than some jurisdictions [in this area of equal protec-
123. Id. at 868.
124. Id. at 866.
125. Id.
126. Benavides v. American Chrome & Chem., Inc., 803 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1994).
127. Id.
128. A writ of error is defined as: "A writ used from a court of appellate jurisdiction
directed to the judge of record requiring him remit to the appellate court the record before
him." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1968).
129. Benavides v. American Chrome & Chem., Inc. 907 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. 1995).
The ninth judge concurred in part.
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tion law in that both courts have reversed decisions in which was a factor
considered during voir dire, even to the extent that other race-neutral
were also present]."13
Although the court appeared to waffle at the suggestion that it was a
progressive step ahead of the federal mixed motive doctrine in equal pro-
tection law, it did unequivocally endorse the "taint view" approach to
determining whether purposeful discrimination has vitiated the juror se-
lection process. 3'
E. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District Departs from Hill and
the Mixed Motive Doctrine and Follows Benavides
Five years would pass after the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Benavides v. American Chrome & Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District in Dallas would have an opportunity to
revisit the Batson/Edmonson mixed motive doctrine. In Guzman v. State,
an attorney admitted that race was a factor he considered during the per-
emptory challenge stage of trial.132
In a strange turn of events, Justice Miller, who while sitting on the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concurred in the result of Hill, reconsid-
ered and dismissed Hill in a case before the Dallas Court of Appeals. 33
In Guzman, Justice Miller abandoned the mixed motive doctrine in Hill
by alluding to its splintered plurality decision in which four of the judges
supported and the four other judges joined in the concurring opinion that
held that race may never be a factor for a peremptory strike, even when
coupled with a race-neutral reason.13 1
While the writ of error to Guzman was pending in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District in Dallas
struck down the Batson/Edmonson mixed motive doctrine once again in
favor of the "taint view.' 135 In Sparks v. State, the state prosecutor ad-
mitted that he considered race as a factor in striking a potential juror, and
then asserted Hill's adoption of the Batson/Edmonson mixed motive doc-
trine in his defense. 136 The court disagreed with the assertion that the
Hill decision reflected the current state of the law and held that the State
130. See id. (quoting Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W. 2d 489, (Tex. 1991).
131. Id.
132. See generally Guzman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2000, no pet.).
133. Guzman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 237, 242-43 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2000, no pet.).
134. Id. at 242. Incidentally, Justice Miller also reitified that he merely concurred in
the result of Hill.
135. Sparks v. State, 68 S.W.3d 6, 15 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2001, pet. ref'd).
136. Id. at 11.
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could not insulate itself from the effects of racial bias by merely proffer-
ing an accompanying racially neutral reason for the peremptory strike.'37
F. State v. Guzman: The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Overturns
the Fifth District's Decision and Endorses the Mixed Motive
Doctrine
The fallout from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Hill
v. State,138 coupled with the Fifth Circuit's dereliction of the mixed mo-
tive doctrine affirmed therein, led the Court of Criminal Appeals to avail
itself of the opportunity to reaffirm its opinion in Hill v. State.139 The
court acquiesced to the federal standard BatsonlEdmonson mixed motive
doctrine in Guzman v. State.140 In Guzman, a capital murder case where
a Batson/Edmonson challenge implicated the mixed motive doctrine, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vehemently denounced the application
of the "taint view" and once again endorsed the Batson/Edmonson mixed
motive doctrine.
14 1
In its analysis, the court dismissed the "taint view" alluding to the fact
that it was not constitutionally mandated. 142 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of the United States had yet to examine the legitimacy of the
mixed motive doctrine in the Batson/Edmonson context.' 43 Moreover,
the Court cited the ominous application of the mixed motive doctrine in
other Fourteenth Amendment implications, such as Title VII employ-
ment discrimination cases stemming from the decisions in the Arlington
Heights and Mt. Healthy cases. 1 44 The court deduced the mixed motive
doctrine was just as germane to the context of a Batson/Edmonson
challenge. 145
Once again, a splintered 146 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals impetu-
ously adhered to the federal standard when it dismissed the "taint view"
approach as a superfluous expansion of Fourteenth Amendment protec-
137. Id. at 12.
138. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, (Tex. Crim. App. 1992, pet. granted).
139. Id.
140. Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc) (reiterat-
ing that race may be a factor among other considerations during the peremptory challenge
stage of trial, but it may not be the only factor).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 248.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 249-50 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)). An
employment discrimination case where the mixed motive doctrine was applied.
145. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 250.
146. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision in a 5
to 4 vote.
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tions in the Batson/Edmonson challenge context. 1 47 Although the major-
ity of the court displayed its intransigence with regard to expanding the
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment in this context, the
Guzman decision was hardly devoid of critics 148.
In his dissent, Judge Womack stated, "to excuse such obvious prejudice
because the challenged party can also articulate nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the peremptory strike would erode what little protection Batson
provides against discrimination in jury selection. "149
Despite such criticism, in a 5-4 decision, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals confronted the Fifth Circuit's application of "taint view" analysis
to the Fourteenth Amendment in a Batson/Edmonson setting that was
inapposite to the Hill decision and reaffirmed the mixed motive doc-
trine. 151 The opinion in Guzman is the most recent ruling from any Texas
court regarding the application of the Batson/Edmonson mixed motive
doctrine, and thus is the current state of the law as applied by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. Although the Supreme Court of Texas has
previously adopted the "taint view" in Powers and reaffirmed it in Bena-
vides, one can only wonder if Guzman has paved the way for the Su-
preme Court of Texas to fall into line with federal standard. This would
abrogate Powers and depart from the bright line rule it endorsed with the
"taint view."
Presently, Texas case law in the area espouses a split in opinion be-
tween the state's two highest courts. On one hand, the Supreme Court of
Texas (the state's highest civil court) has held that the "taint view" is the
appropriate analysis for situations where an attorney has both permissible
and non-permissible reasons for peremptorily striking a juror. On the
other, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the state's highest criminal
court) has more recently denounced the "taint view" and continues to
adhere to the federal mixed motive doctrine.151 Although the courts of
Texas have made this area of law somewhat inchoate, it is the position of
this Comment that the Fourteenth Amendment should be impermeable
to such erosion as the mixed motive doctrine.
147. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 249. This holding reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision in a
5 to 4 vote.
148. See Mary Alice Robbins, Dual-Motive Jury Strikes Don't Always Violate Equal
Protection Rights in Texas PREDICTING THE FUTURE, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Vol. 226, No. 104; pg. 4, May 30, 2002 (quoting Guzman's defense attorney who states that
the mixed motive doctrine negates the protections afforded by Batson/Edmonson).
149. Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 251 (Womack, J. with whom Meyers, Price, and Johnson
J.J., join, dissenting).
150. Id. at 244.
151. See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991); Benavides v. American
Chrome & Chem., Inc. 907 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. 1995); Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242,
244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
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IV. THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS SHOULD ABANDON
THE MIXED MOTIVE DOCTRINE
The thesis of this Comment is that the State of Texas, specifically the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, should ameliorate the federal equal
protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that it
is incompatible with the application of the mixed motive doctrine in the
context of Batson/Edmonson hearings. The corollary of this assertion is
that once discriminatory intent is found to have occurred during the juror
selection process, the entire process becomes tainted to the extent that
the defendant can no longer be ensured of a fair trial. Just as one bad
apple ruins the entire barrel, an admission of the consideration of race as
a factor in the juror selection process spoils the entire process. 152 Once
an attorney is found to have considered race as a factor, he or she should
not be subsequently allowed to offer an ancillary reason for exercising the
peremptory strike discriminatorily and then participate with impunity in a
trial in light of perfunctory voir dire.
The federal mixed motive doctrine operates unmindfully of the pur-
pose of Batson and Edmonson. Thus, it is nothing less than enigmatic as
to why the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would exacerbate the consti-
tutional rights of its citizens by departing from the Supreme Court of
Texas and the "taint view" approach. The mixed motive doctrine is a
paradigm of reciprocity gone awry in that it allows one rule of law to
accomplish the undoing of the protections afforded by another.
A. The Mixed Motive Doctrine Is Inconsistent with the Intent and
Purpose of Batson/Edmonson
The federal mixed motive doctrine operates as a systematic perversion
of the intent and purpose of Batson/Edmonson, in that its application in
this context makes the equal protection requirements afforded therein all
but illusory in practice. The mixed motive doctrine allows attorneys to
openly consider the race of the prospective juror as one of the factors for
selection as a juror and the opportunity to participate in the trial process.
This is a patent contravention of Batson v. Kentucky where the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
peremptorily challenging jurors solely on account of their race. 153
Arguments have been made that a literal interpretation of the word
"solely" in the aforementioned statement would lead one to believe that
the Supreme Court anticipated such situations where an attorney has ad-
mitted that he or she considered the race of a potential juror and then
152. Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
153. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79-80 (1986).
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peremptorily struck him or her on account of race and other, permissible
considerations.154 However, implicit in this argument is the assumption
that the Court considered the situation where an attorney openly admits
he or she used race as a factor in the selection of jurors and not just
situations where the consideration of race is subjectively determined by
the trial judge to have lurked, latently, in the juror selection process.
There is no language or analysis in Batson or Edmonson that would sup-
port such an assertion and it would be difficult to contend that Justice
Powell was pondering just such a scenario and used the word "solely" as a
caveat. The United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
this question in Howard v. Senkowski, 55 and declined to interpret the
word "solely" in a manner that would facilitate the inapplicability of the
mixed motive doctrine to Batson/Edmonson challenges. However, as an
aside, the court back-peddled before asserting such a fiat and noted, "it is
always hazardous to seize upon a single word or phrase in a judicial opin-
ion and build upon it a rule that was not in issue in the case being de-
cided., 1 56 Until the Supreme Court of the United States decides to hear
a case where the Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine is impli-
cated in a Batson/Edmonson hearing, any determinations of judicial in-
tent regarding the application of the mixed motive doctrine in such
occasions based on the term "solely" are purely speculative and should be
highly suspect.
Advocates of the mixed motive doctrine argue that because Batson
could be read to allow the mixed motive doctrine in such scenarios where
an attorney openly admits he or she used race as a factor during the juror
selection process, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Supreme
Court would subsequently apply it in such a scenario.1 57 However, this
position of sanguinity is easily rebutted because Batson clearly stands for
the notion that the consideration of race as a factor during voir dire is
unconstitutional.1 58 The Batson court uninhibitedly denounced the con-
sideration of race in the juror selection process and noted: "a person's
race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a juror. ,159 Justice Powell also
154. Geoffrey A. Gannaway, Texas Independence: The Lone Star State Serves as an
Example to Other Jurisdictions as it Rejects Mixed-Motive Defense to Batson Challenges, 21
Rev. Litig. 375, 394 (2002).
155. Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1993).
156. Id.
157. Holly E. Engelmann, Note: Guzman v. State, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2117, 2124 (2003).
158. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
159. See id. at 87 (quoting, in part, Theil v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-224
(1946)).
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clearly stated that, "the Constitution prohibits all forms of purposeful ra-
cial discrimination in [the] selection of jurors., 160
It is problematic to reconcile this sentiment with the mixed motive no-
tion that discriminatorily motivated peremptory strikes are permissible in
the event that the striking attorney can merely offer an accompanying
racially neutral reason for the strike. Given the aforementioned subse-
quent expansions of Batson protections to civil litigants161 and in the ar-
eas of gender 162 and ethnicity,163 it is just as easily deduced that the
Supreme Court would supplant the mixed motive doctrine in favor of the
more expansive protections afforded by the "taint view."
Put simply, it is difficult to square the mixed motive doctrine with the
Fourteenth Amendment protections of Batson/Edmonson. The opportu-
nity given to an attorney to proffer a neutral explanation for a discrimina-
torily exercised peremptory strike undermines the standards and plain
language of Batson, which outlawed the consideration of race during the
juror selection process. The disparity between Batson and Edmonson's
purpose and the end results caused by the implementation of the mixed
motive doctrine are inapposite and should to be reconciled by aban-
doning the mixed motive doctrine in favor of the "taint view."
B. The "Taint View" is a Better Alternative and is More Consistent
with Batson
The "taint view" is a bright line rule and is the antithesis of the mixed
motive doctrine. Under the "taint view" discriminatory intent revealed in
a peremptory strike, even if coupled with nondiscriminatory reasons,
taints the entire juror selection process requiring a reversal.' 1 Thus the
"taint view" expands the protection of the Equal Protection Clause be-
yond that which has been interpreted to be required under the United
States Constitution.
The "taint view" is more consistent with Batson to the extent that it
reconciles the disparate results afflicted by the application of the mixed
motive doctrine in Batson/Edmonson contexts. The "taint view's" bright
line rule curtails a Batson/Edmonson hearing at the second step, dis-
cussed infra, by rejecting the notion that once discriminatory intent is
160. See id. at 88 (quoting, in part, Theil v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-224
(1946)).
161. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (extending Batson
to civil litigants).
162. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to gender
cases).
163. See generally Hernandez v. New York 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (extending Batson
to ethnicity cases).
164. Wagmet v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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found that a race-neutral explanation may be offered to negate the pro-
tected conduct. The "taint view" ends any further examination of the
striking party's motive once discriminatory intent is revealed and cuts the
Batson three-step process one step short by disallowing the implicated
party to justify his discriminatory actions by simply offering an accompa-
nying race-neutral motive for the strike.16 Thus, the "taint view" sup-
ports the unqualified requirement in Batson that the consideration of
race as a factor during the juror selection process is unconstitutional.166
Whereas the mixed motive doctrine provides an avenue for the unscru-
pulous attorney to backdoor his or her way out of vitiating the juror se-
lection process, the "taint view" abruptly slams that door on those
attorneys who would otherwise peremptorily strike a potential juror be-
cause of his or her race. Thus, it is hard to understand why the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals continues to adhere to the mixed motive doc-
trine since the "taint view" not only furthers the purpose of Batson, but
also expands Fourteenth Amendment protections for litigation partici-
pants with little, if any, additional repercussions upon the trial process,
save the administrative and fiscal implications of ordering a new trial in
the event that a discriminatorily motivated peremptory strike occurs.
The "taint view" analysis or theory is a product of litigation, which has
been devised and implicated to combat just such situations where an at-
torney considered race as a factor in the juror selection process coupled
with other racially neutral factors.167 In contrast, the mixed motive doc-
trine is a derivative of wrongful termination actions and was subsequently
applied to other actions that fall under the purview of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (such as the juror selection
process). 6 s Thus, the "taint view" analysis was initially contrived as a
Fourteenth Amendment protection applicable in the juror selection pro-
cess and its counterpart, the mixed motive doctrine, arose in another con-
text and then was applied to the equal protection context of juror
discrimination. 169 Hence, it is somewhat perplexing as to why federal
courts continue to ominously apply the mixed motive doctrine to all Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection claims when a more suitable alter-
165. Sparks v. State, 68 S.W.3d 6, 10 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2001, pet. ref'd.).
166. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
167. See generally Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (not-
ing that the mixed motive doctrine is inconsistent as applied in the juror selection context).
168. See generally Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
(1977) (applying and construing the mixed motive doctrine in the context of a wrongful
termination proceeding).
169. See generally Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 242 (applying the mixed motive doctrine to
the juror selection process).
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native of examining protected conduct in the juror selection process is
available.
Although the five federal circuit courts that have addressed the appli-
cation of the mixed motive doctrine in the Batson/Edmonson context
have adopted and upheld the constitutionality of the doctrine, 170 at least
five states have rejected it in favor of the "taint view., 171 In addition,
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court has also denounced
the mixed motive doctrine in favor of the "taint view" in a dissent from
the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari.172
C. The Mixed Motive Doctrine as Initially Implicated in the
Employment Context can be Categorically Distinguished as
Applied in the Context of Batson/Edmonson Challenges
The origin of the Fourteenth Amendment mixed motive doctrine is es-
poused in the context of equal protection claims arising from employ-
ment discrimination and wrongful termination claims.17 3 The Supreme
Court has also applied the mixed motive doctrine to Title VII gender
discrimination cases. 1 74 The Court has yet to confront the mixed motive
doctrine in the context of a Batson/Edmonson challenge hearing, 175 how-
ever it has held that the mixed motive doctrine is an exculpatory defense
that rebuts a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in other
Fourteenth Amendment applications. 76 Guided by this precedent, five
Federal Circuit Courts have interpreted the decisions in these employ-
170. Robbins, supra, note 149, at pg. 4. Specifically, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 11th
Circuits have adopted the mixed motive defense.
171. See State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting the mixed
motive doctrine in favor of the "taint view" in a case where the attorney claimed that
Southern men are prejudicial against working pregnant women); Payton v. Kearse, 495
S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998) (rejecting the mixed motive doctrine in a case where the attor-
ney struck a Caucasian juror because she was of "redneck variety"); Rector v. State, 444
S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (denouncing the mixed motive doctrine in a case
where an African-American woman was struck because she "had a big gold tooth with a
pattern on it right in the front of her mouth"); Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 490
(Tex. 1991); and McCray v. State, 738 So.2d 911, 914 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). Additionally,
a United States court of military review has also adopted the "taint view." United States v.
Greene, 36 M.J. 274, 282 (CMA 1993).
172. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989).
173. See generally Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
(1977) (applying the mixed motive doctrine in the context of a wrongful termination pro-
ceeding); and see generally Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (implicating the mixed motive defense in a wrongful termination case).
174. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, (1989) (applying the mixed mo-
tive doctrine in an employment discrimination case).
175. Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
176. Robbins, supra, note 149, at pg. 4.
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ment discrimination equal protection claims to apply to discrimination
claims in the juror selection process. 177 The expansion of the application
of the mixed motive defense in the juror selection context is counterintui-
tive to the extent that it would supersede the more expansive Batsonl
Edmonson protections to render them all but illusory. This ancillary ap-
plication of the mixed motive doctrine effectively lessens the protections
afforded by the Equal Protection Clause to the juror selection process.
When the mixed motive doctrine is applied in a situation where an at-
torney openly admits to peremptorily striking a juror because she was an
African-American who "had a big gold tooth with a pattern on it right in
the front of her mouth, ' it gives the attorney a subsequent opportunity
to supplement this consideration by coupling it with a race-neutral cause
for the strike; thereby farcically negating the effect of such purposeful
discrimination. This set of circumstances is qualitatively distinct from the
application of the mixed motive doctrine in the employment context.
The mixed motive doctrine is commonly applied in employment dis-
crimination circumstances where the employer did consider the race of an
employee as a factor for his or her termination, but would have termi-
nated him or her anyway because he or she was consistently late to work
or made personal calls on the company phone all day.179 The mixed mo-
tive doctrine is applied in this instance to prevent the employer from hav-
ing to rehire the employee on the account of the employer's
impermissible conduct and then subsequently terminate the employee
again because of legitimate reasons. 8 °
These two fact patterns are categorically distinct in two ways. One, the
application of the Supreme Court's holding in Purkett v. Elem, 181 which
states that the Batson mandated neutral reason explanation for an alleged
discriminatory peremptory strike, "need not be persuasive or even plausi-
ble," is not applicable in the employment discrimination context. Instead
it is a ruling specifically concerned with the functionality of the Batson/
Edmonson analysis.182 Thus, as applied to the context of a Batson/Ed-
monson hearing, the mixed motive doctrine has a lesser threshold of
proof than when applied in the employment discrimination context.
Two, in the employment context, courts have the opportunity to ex-
amine evidence of the employer's treatment of similar employees or ap-
177. Id. These five Federal Circuit Courts formed what is colloquially referred to as
the "federal standard" in this regard.
178. See Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1994).
179. Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 249-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
180. See generally Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
285-86 (1977).
181. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
182. Id.
2004]
THE SCHOLAR
plicants to objectively determine his culpability with regard to his
prejudicial conduct.183 In the BatsonlEdmonson context, the alleged dis-
criminating attorney's motives and discriminatory track record with re-
gard to juror selection patterns are privileged, and go unchecked so the
trial court must subjectively surmise the validity of his or her race-neutral
explanation. t 84
These two fundamental distinctions coupled with the fact that the
mixed motive doctrine operates in a manner that inadvertently accom-
plishes the undoing of the protections afforded by Batson, distinguish its
application in the context of the juror selection process from that of the
employment discrimination context. The mixed motive doctrine found its
genesis in the area of employment law and as applied, ineffectuates the
purpose of Batson. The mixed motive doctrine has no place in the juror
selection process except to exacerbate the conundrum of ceasing pur-
poseful discrimination.
V. PREVENTING PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION IN THE JUROR
SELECTION PROCESS
Preventing discrimination in the juror selection process is a problem
unique to non-heterogeneous societies such as ours. Total racial equality
at all levels may someday be obtainable, but we are far from it today.
Until that time, precautionary measures must be in place during the juror
selection process to safeguard the equal protection of the law to all races
and minority groups.
The juror selection process, in particularly the peremptory challenge
system, is uniquely vulnerable to discriminatory conduct in that it is dis-
criminatory by its very nature.185 Although the participating attorneys in
the juror selection process are charged as the vanguards of its creditabil-
ity, it is far too often suspect to purposeful discrimination. This is pre-
cisely the reason the three-step Batson analysis was promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the United States.186
A. Eliminating The Peremptory Challenge System
There is some question as to whether Batson does enough to eliminate
purposeful discrimination in the peremptory challenge system. The per-
183. Compare Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989), with Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).
184. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989).
185. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
186. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
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emptory challenge has long been a fixture in our courtrooms, but many
are now urging for its elimination.187
Peremptory challenges are merely judicially, "created means to the
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial" and are not consti-
tutionally protected rights.188 Therefore, the right to exercise peremptory
challenges is a privilege and could be withheld without abridging any
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 89
United States Supreme Court Justice Marshall urged just this in his
concurring opinion to Batson' 90 and Justice Meyers of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals recently agreed with him.' 91 Other critics of the per-
emptory challenge system have advocated for its elimination, and the en-
largement of the challenge for cause system.192
I do not advocate the drastic elimination of the peremptory challenge
system, but do agree that more than a modest proposal is necessary to
eliminate the problem of racial discrimination in the juror selection
process.
B. Jury Quotas
Perhaps a more modest solution to the racially discriminatory exclusion
of jurors in the juror selection process would be the requirement of pro-
portional representation of race on a jury. Much in the way affirmative
action works to facilitate the hiring and promotion of minorities in the
job market, this system would ensure minority representation on juries, at
least to the extent of the minority's proportional representation in their
respective community or state. Although this measure may be somewhat
drastic, there is precedence for the successful implementation of a quota
system in the affirmative action context. Undoubtedly, it would categori-
cally exclude claims of racially based juror exclusion during voir dire.
Although the Supreme Court has held that a defendant does not have
the constitutional right to a jury composed in whole or part of members
187. See id. at 102-03, 107 (dissenting from the opinion, Justice Marshall makes an
argument for the elimination of the peremptory challenge system). See also Jeffrey Ab-
ramson, Abolishing The Peremptory But Enlarging The Challenge For Cause, APA NEWS-
LEarER, Vol. 96, Spring 1997 (arguing for the elimination of the peremptory challenge
system); see also Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 860-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (concur-
ring in the opinion, Justice Meyers of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals advocated for
the elimination of the peremptory challenge system).
188. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 52 (1992).
189. Id.
190. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03, 107.
191. Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 860-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
192. See also Abramson, supra, note 189 (arguing for the elimination of the peremp-
tory challenge system).
2004]
THE SCHOLAR
of his own race or minority group, he does have a "right to be tried by a
jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory crite-
ria. "193 Many years ago the Court dismissed such a quota proposal as
"impossible." 194 While a quota proposal is presently plausible as a some-
what complicated measure, there is no doubt that such a system would
succinctly end the problem.
C. Attorney Accountability and Professional Responsibility
The simplest way to end purposeful discrimination by attorneys during
the peremptory challenge process is for the individual attorneys to oper-
ate unmindfully of racial considerations while selecting jurors. Obvi-
ously, no one is counting on that. What complicates this further is that
the penalties for Batson violations appear to be highly ineffectual and
have never been enforced.
195
The American Bar Association (ABA) condemned the practice of ra-
cially motivated juror exclusion just eight years ago.196 Since that time,
the ABA has yet to admonish a single member for carrying out this prac-
tice. 197 Nor has a single state ever disciplined an attorney for exercising a
peremptory challenge discriminatorily.198 Although the practice has
been condemned, racially motivated juror exclusion has not been viewed
as professional misconduct to the extent that no attorney has been disci-
plined for it, yet apparently it occurs frequently. 199
Until greater accountability in the juror selection process is enforced
and changes are made to ethical rules and disciplinary processes, attor-
neys are left to be guided by their own consciences with little reinforce-
ment from their profession.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until the day comes when preventative safeguards are no longer neces-
sary to protect the juror selection process from purposeful discrimination,
the judicial system must progress proactively to secure the right to a fair
and impartial jury and to protect the right of citizens to fulfill the public
duty of serving on juries.
193. See Engelmann, supra, note 158, at 2123 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 85, 107 (1986)).
194. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950).
195. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Mis-
conduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 266 (2003).
196. Brown, Jr., supra, note 197, at 271-72.
197. Id. at 272.
198. Id. at 282.
199. Id. at 288-89.
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An individual's right to participate in the criminal and civil justice pro-
cess as a juror is a right that is essential to our system of justice. Addi-
tionally, the criminal or civil defendant has the right to be judged by an
impartial jury representative of his peers. The safeguarding of this right is
of significant importance and should be done with the utmost of dili-
gence. Any additional minor inconvenience this places on the trial court
should be endured to the extent that would otherwise exacerbate the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.
It is for these reasons that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should
abandon the federal mixed motive doctrine in favor of the "taint view."
Texas should support a "bright line" rule holding that any consideration
of race in the juror selection process, specifically in the peremptory chal-
lenge stage, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Discrimination has no place in the courtroom, especially in
the selection of jurors. The mixed motive doctrine is a derision of the
principals enunciated in Batson and casts back the penumbral Fourteenth
Amendment rights Batson established ensuring the non-discriminatory
selection of jurors. It is asinine to believe that our highest criminal court
would allow an attorney to brazenly acknowledge that he struck a juror
because of his or her race and then validate the strike because of an ancil-
lary incidental factor that does not even have to be plausible or persua-
sive. It is pure balderdash to believe that one could articulate a race-
neutral explanation for exercising a peremptory strike discriminatorily
when race is, itself, part of that explanation.2 °°
200. Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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